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Foreword 
The author shows how to  model imprecision in the decision maker's judgements, within a 
Bayesian context. He provides axioms leading to  work with families of value functions, if the 
problem is under certainty, or  probability distributions and utility functions, if the problem is 
under uncertainty, or probability distributions and utility functions, if the problem is under 
uncertainty. Some solution concepts are suggested. On the whole, he provides a robust decision 
theory based on a set of axioms embodying coherence, and essentially implies carrying out a 
family of coherent decision analyses. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences Program 
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1 Introduction 
The foundations of the Bayesian approach to decision making, see French (1986) 
e.g., require precision in the decision maker's (DM) judgements (preferences, risk 
attitudes, beliefs) which mean precision in the numerical inputs (values, utilities, 
probabilities) to  the analysis. The assessment of these inputs imply the encoding 
of the DM'S judgemental inputs in parameters and the association of an evaluation 
function with each alternative. In practice, the DM may not be ready or able to 
provide the information necessary to  locate the parameters precisely. Instead, he 
may only give some constraints on his judgements: we have to work with a family 
of values or probabilities and utilities. This clashes with the Bayesian foundations. 
We shall call this decision making under partial information. 
We give axiomatic foundations for this case, according to this principle: the 
Bayesian approach assumes that comparative judgements follow a weak order (plus 
some conditions); this leads us to the codification of judgemental inputs in param- 
eters with some uniqueness properties. We shall see that quasi orders regulating 
comparative judgements (plus some similar conditions) correspond to sets of feasi- 
ble parameters and, consequently, to constraints of our kind. We start by modelling 
general preferences under certainty. Then, we analyse belief models. We conclude 
by analysing preferences under uncertainty. A parametric model is introduced to 
analyse problems under certainty and under uncertainty in parallel. The proper 
solution solution concepts are then suggested. An example illustrates the ideas. 
We study only finite alternative, finite state problems. 
Several authors, see Rios (1975) and the references in Nau (1989), have pro- 
posed to work with families of utilities and probabilities to account for imprecision 
in judgements. However, the general emphasis has been on quantitative proper- 
ties of upper and lower probabilities and/or utilities. Our emphasis will be in 
(axiomatic) qualitative characterisat ions. 
Let (A, R), (A, S) be binary relations. We say that: 
Definition 1 (A, R) is  a quasi order if it is  reflezive and transitive. 
(A, R) is a weak order if it is rejlezive, transitive and complete. 
(A, R) is  a strict partial order if it is irrejlezive and transitive. 
Definition 2 S is a covering of R if a ,  b E A, a R b d  aSb. We write it R S. 
From now on, our binary relations shall be written (A, 3). We shall say that 
2 Decision making under certainty 
Suppose a DM has to choose among a finite set A = {al,. . . , a,) of alternatives. 
We model the DM's preferences by a relation 5 interpreted as follows: let a;, a j  E 
A, 'a;5aj' means 'a; is at most as preferred as aj'. Our initial aim is to represent 
it by means of a value function v, see French (1986). Imprecision in the DM's 
preferences lead us to represent 5 by a family of value functions. 
Roubens and Vincke (1985) give a one way representation of quasi orders. 
Roberts (1979) presents a characterisation of strict partial orders. We could give a 
representation of a quasi order by reduction to a strict partial order, but that would 
lead us to order alternatives in a weak Pareto sense. We provide a characterisation 
of quasi orders, which will lead us to a Pareto order, as in the rest of the cases we 
study. 
The result is 
Proposi t ion 1 Let A be a finite set and 5 a relation on A. (A, 5) is a quasi 
order if there are r real functions v l ,  . . . , v, such that 
for a;, a j  E A, for some r E N. 
+ Clearly, (A, 5 ) is reflexive and transitive. 
+ For each a; E A, define 
1 i f a ; 5 a j  
v;(aj) = { 
0 otherwise 
Suppose that a;daj. If ak5a;  then ak5aj ,  thus vk(a;) = vk(aj). If i (ak5a ; ) ,  
then vk(a;) = 0 < vk(aj). Thus, vk(a;) < vk(aj),Vk. 
Suppose l (a ;5a j ) .  Then v;(aj) = 0 < 1 = v;(a;). Thus, l(vk(a;) < vk(aj), Vk). 
Observe that given vl, . . . , v, representing 5 we have: 
Corollary 1 For a;, a, E A 
This result might look innocuous at first sight. However, we easily find that with 
our choice of vl, . . . , v,: 
Proposition 2 Let (A, 5 , )  be a weak order such that 5, is a covering of 5. There 
is X > 0 such that XI = 1 and 
Therefore, we have a procedure to generate the weak orders covering a quasi order. 
3 Decision making under uncertainty 
The DM has to choose among the set A of alternatives. The consequences of each 
alternative are not known with certainty. Nature adopts one of the states of O = 
(1, . . . , k). We associate the consequence a;, to the alternative a; when the state 
is j. a;, belongs to C = {cl , . . . , c,) , the finite space of consequences. We study 
first the problem of modelling beliefs and, then, that of modelling preferences. 
3.1 Modelling beliefs 
Let O be the set of states of Nature. The DM expresses his beliefs over A, the 
algebra of subsets of O. They are modelled in terms of a relation 5r on A in- 
terpreted as follows: 'B5rCL for B, C E A means that 'B is at most as likely to 
occur as CL. We attempt to represent it by a probability distribution. However, 
we cannot expect the judgemental inputs to be as precise as demanded by the 
Bayesian foundations. We can only hope, at best, to delimit possible values for a 
DM'S subjective probability to a small set. Given this, it is natural, perhaps, that 
theories of upper and lower probabilities have developed as in Koopman (1940), 
Smith (1961), Good (1962), Dempster (1967) or Suppes (1974). See also Walley 
and Fine (1979), Shafer (1976) and Nau (1989). In general, their emphasis is on 
quantitative properties of lower and upper probabilities, though Suppes gives a 
qualitative treatment of the problem, using semiorders, and Nau provides an ax- 
iomatic in terms of betting behaviour. In our opinion, the emphasis should be on 
imprecision in beliefs leading us to work with a family of probabilities. That these 
probabilities have upper and lower probabilities is interesting, but no more. 
We justify this approach axiomatically, characterising probability quasi orders 
by systems of inequalities. Scott (1964) uses systems of inequalities to represent 
probability weak orders; Fishburn (1969, 1985) uses them to represent probability 
semiorders and interval orders. Our result weakens Scott's axioms, giving a simple 
and elegant qualitative treatment of probability quasi orders. Giron and Rios 
(1980) provide a characterisation in a more general setting. 
We shall need the following property (where X B  represents the characteristic 
function of the subset B E A ): 
Definition 3 (Proper ty  P )  Let @,A, Sf be as above. (A, sf) satisfies property 
P if for all integers 1, r 2 1 and for all BI,  Cl, . . . , B I + ~  ,CI+~ E A, such that 
BisrC;,i = 1,. . . , l  and 
then CI+I 5 r  
The equation in property P simply states that each i E O appears the same number 
of times in the sets B1,. . . , BI, BI+], . r . ,  Bl+1 than in the sets C1,. . . , CI, .:. 
, We can give a betting interpretation of property P: suppose the DM receives 
a prize of utility 1 for each B; or C; that obtains, i = 1,. . . ,1, and a prize of 
utility r for obtaining B I + ~  or Then, if B;llrC; for i = 1,.  . . , I ,  it should be 
Cl+i 5rB1+1. 
The main result of this section is 
Proposition 3 Let O, A, be as above. Then: 
P2. Property P, 
are equivalent to the ezistence of a (nonempty, finite) family P of probabilities p 
such that 
B5!C - p(B) I p(C), VP E P. 
+ Immediate. 
+ We first see that there is a weak order (A, st'), such that A!' is a covering of 
4!, - which may be represented by a probability distribution. The proof is based 
in similar results mentioned above. The assertion is true if there is a probability 
distribution p such that 
Given p, we define pi = p(i), so we can write p = Associate an inequality 
with each comparison B i p C .  Associate the inequality 
with the comparison 0 41 O. Then, we can rewrite the system as 
where the b's are vectors whose elements are in (-1, 0, 1)  and b, is a vector of 1's. 
The assertion is true iff S is consistent. Suppose S is inconsistent, then (see, e.g., 
Rockafellar, 1970, p. 198) there are numbers p, 2 0 and p, > 0 such that 
As the b's are vectors of rational components, the p's may be taken rationals, and, 
consequently, integers. Also, at least one of the p,'s has to be positive. As each 
inequality is related to a comparison B,A!C,, we deduce that, for some 1 2 1, 
By property P, OArO, which is a contradiction. So S is consistent: there is a weak 
order (A, At'), such that 5 r '  is a covering of <r, which may be represented by a 
probability distribution. 
Let us call (A, 5,) to the the weak order associated with p. Let P = {p : 
z 5,). We know that P # 0. Let J* = Q,? 5,; clearly, z 5'. Suppose - 
B, C E A are such that B # C, B5*C : Vp E P, it is BJ,C. Thus, writing 
as 
pb 2 0, 
with b E {-1,0,1), this inequality is a consequence of the system 
(Observe that S' adds only to S the equation 
pb, = 0. 
When this happens, p; = 0, Vi, pb 2 0, Vb). 
By Farkas' lemma, see Rockafellar (1970), there are nonnegative numbers p,, p, 
such that 
Cp.b, + p.b. = b 
As b # 0, at least one of the p's has to be positive. As the b's are vectors with 
rational components, the p's may be chosen rational. Thus, there are nonnegative 
integers P,, P,, P, with /3 and at least one of the other p's positive such that 
This implies that there are B;, C; E A, i = 1,. . . , I, with I 2 1, such that B,Jr C;, Vi 
and 
X B ~ + - . . + X B , + P X ~ = X ~ ~ + . . . + X ~ , + P X B  
By property P, B5rC. That is, J* E S f .  
The 5,'s are weak orders in A, which is finite. Thus, we may choose pl , .  . . , p t 
such that 
Clearly, (A, At) is a quasi order. Again, we have: 
Corollary 2 Let P = . . ,pt),  t 2 1, be a family ofprobabilities characterising 
on A.  Then 
Note that if there is no judgement gathered concerning events A and B, then there 
is p E [PI such that p(A) = p(B), as is frequently assumed. Observe also that if 
0 +r D,  there is p E P such that p(D) > 0, a fact which we use in proposition 4. 
To end this section, we study conditional probabilities. Non unicity of P leads 
to problems while defining probabilities of events conditional on different events. 
However, in our context, it is enough to deal with probabilities conditional on the 
same event. BID represents the event B given D. The result, of simple proof, is 
Proposi t ion 4 Let 0, A, 5 r  be as before. Suppose (A, At) verifies PI ,  P 2  and 
P3. For any B, C, D E A, such that 8 +r D, BIDArCID ifl B n D 5 r C  n D.  
Then, there is a family P of probabilities such that for any B,C, D E A, with 
8 +r D, 
BID5rCJD - p(BID) I p(CID),Vp E P : p(D) > 0 
where p(BJD)  = p (B  n D)/p(D).  
Therefore, Bayes' theorem holds in this case. 
3.2 Modelling preferences under uncertainty 
The DM may express his preferences over the set Po(C) of probability measures 
over C, the (finite) space of consequences. We model the DM'S preferences over 
Po(C) with the relation 5,' interpreted as follows: 'p5,q' means 'p is at most as 
preferred as q'. We attempt to represent it via expected utility of a utility function. 
Imprecision in the DM'S preferences leads us to the representation 
where U is a family of utility functions. 
Aumman (1962) and Fishburn (1982) provide sufficient conditions for a a one 
way representation. White (1972) gives conditions to represent an order in Rn by 
a finite family of linear value functions, which may be translated to this context. 
The following simple result establishes the necessity of the main conditions we 
shall use to get the representation. 
Proposit ion 5 Suppose that (Po(C), 5,) admits the representation (1). Then, 
Bl. (Po(C), 5,) is a quasi order. 
B3. cxp + (1 - cx)rA,crq + (1 - cr)s,Vcr E (O,l]+r5,s. 
As a first step, we shall look for a one way utility representation as Aumman's 
or Fishburn's. We substitute their continuity condition by a nontriviality condition 
(B4): thus, continuity is not essential for a one way utility representation. 
Proposit ion 6 Let C, Po(C), 5, be as before. Suppose that 5, satisfies Bl, B2. 
Then if: 
there is a real function u on C such that 
Our proof will be based up to a point on Fishburn's (1982) proof, which in turn 
develops Aumman's ideas. Let us call 
We first prove that: 
1. E is convex. 
Let y , z  E E. There are p ,q , r , s  such that q3,p ,  r s , s ,  y  = p  - q , z  = s  - r .  
Applying B 2 ,  we have 
for cr E ( 0 , l ) .  Thus, 
a ( p  - q )  + ( 1  - cr)(s - r )  = cry + ( 1  - cr)z E E. 
Extending the above argument by induction we may prove that 
2. aj > 0 ,  C crj = 1 ,  qj5*pj* C a j q j 5 ,  C crjpj. Then: 
3.  Q j  > O ,  C crj = 1 ,  q j 3 * p j , j  = 1, .  . . , n - 1,  C a j q j  = C crjpj*pn5*qn. 
Because of 2 ,  we only have to prove the result for n = 2. If cr E ( 0 ,  I ) ,  
( 1  - ~ ) q z  = crpl + ( 1  - &)p2 and q15.pl, we have . 9 1  + ( 1  - cr)pzS.crpl + 
( 1  - Q ) P ~  = ~ q i  + ( 1  - cr)q2, so that pz+ -* q  2 .  
Let S be the minimal convex cone containing E. From 3 ,  we get: 
4.  p,q E Po(C) ,p  - q  E S*q5*p. 
We have that 
P - q = C ~ n ( p n - q n )  
with an > 0,qn5.pn. Then, 
As qn5*pn,  applying 3 ,  we get q 5 - p .  Hence we may write, 
5. P, q  E Po(C) ,p  - q  E E - qS*p .  
Then, due to B 4 ,  S  # R": as S is a convex cone (see Rockafellar 1970, p. 99)  
there is u # 0  such that x f S+uz 2 0.  Let us call u ( q )  = u;, i = 1 , .  . . , s.  We 
have: 
q5.p'~ - 9  E E C S*uq 5 up* C ~ ( q ) ~ ;  5 C 
E(u, 9) s E(u, P). 
To get the two way representation we need to restore continuity, through axiom 
B3. Aumman (1964) provides a related result of more complicated proof and under 
stronger conditions. 
Proposition 7 Let C, Po(C),d, be as bejore. Suppose that 5, satisfies Bl-B3. 
Then, there is a jamily U o j  real junctions u such that 
~ 5 * q  e E(u, p) I E(u, q), Vu E U. 
Let E, S be as in proposition 6. cl(E) is convex (and closed). Let u E cl(E). 
There is uo E E such that 
Define u, = onuo+(l  -on)u,  with 1 2 on 1 0. We have un = p, -qn with qn5,pn. 
k k Then, there are convergent subsequences, say pnk -+ p*, qnk + q*. Consequently, 
k pnk - qnk = Unk  + 21 
k 
Pnk - Q n k  + p* - 9.9 
that is, u = p* - q*. Hence, as uo = po - go, with qo5,po, 
&(PO - 90) + (1 - a)(p* - q*) E E,Vo E ( O , l ]  
therefore 
oqo + (1 - a)q*5*opo + (1 - o)p*,Vo E (0 9 .  11 
By B3, q*d,p* and u E E. Thus, E is closed. Consequently, S is a closed, convex 
set (cone) and it can be characterised by means of its support hyperplanes: there 
is a family W of vectors w such that 
Then 
Defining u,(c;) = w; and U = {u, : w E W) we get 
q5.p w E(u,q) I E(u,p),Vu E U. 
As in the previous models, 
Corollary 3 Let C,Po(C), <,,U be as before. Then 
3.3 Modelling judgements under uncertainty 
We summarise results concerning belief and preference modelling. Imprecision in 
the DM'S beliefs can be modelled with a family 7' of probability distributions p. 
Consequently, we associate a family {p(ai))pEp of lotteries with each alternative 
a;. Alternatives are compared on the basis of the associated lotteries. Impreci- 
sion in preferences between lotteries leads to imprecision in preferences between 
alternatives. We assume a preference relation 5 on A, represented by 'a; 5 aj' for 
a;, a j  E A and interpreted as 'a; is at most as preferred as aj', given by 
Proposition 8 Let A,C, O, A, r ,  5,  be as propositions 3 and 7, and 7', U, the 
corresponding families of probabilities and utilities. Let {p(a;))pEp be the set of 
lotteries associated with each alternative a;. Let 5 be defined as above. Then, 
a; 5 a j  w E(u,p(ai)) < E(u,p(aj)),Vu E U, Vp E 7'. 
The proof is simple. 
4 A parametric model 
The previous results show how to model imprecision in judgements by families of 
values or utilities and probabilities. Problems under certainty and under uncer- 
tainty can be treated in parallel if we introduce a convenient parametric represen- 
tation, as we briefly illustrate. 
4.1 The certainty case 
When (A, 5) is a quasi order, 5 may be modelled by 
For a g i v e n v  E V, let w; = v(a;) and w = (wl ,..., w,). Let S = { w :  w = 
v(A), v E V}. Typically, S is defined by constraints of the kind w; < wj. We can 
define the evaluation of the j-th alternative as \Irj(w) = wj. 
Then, taking into account the results of section 1, we can represent 5 as follows 
4.2 The uncertainty case 
When (A, At) is a probability quasi order, can be modelled by a family P of 
probabilities p: 
C 5 r B  - P(C) I P(B),VP E p. 
1 For a given p E P, let us call w; = p(8,), w1 = (wl,. . . , wk) and S1 = {wl : w = 
p(O), p E P}. S1 is defined by constraints of the kind cwl 2 0, where the c's are 
vectors of -l's, 0's and l's, and a constraint c!=~ w; > 0. 
Imprecision in preferences has been modelled with a family U of utility func- 
tions. For a given u E U, call wk+l = u(cl), w2 = (wk+1, . . . , wk+#) and S2 = {w2 = 
u(C), u E U}. Calling w = (wl, w2), the evaluation of the j-th alternative takes 
the form 
1 Qj(w) = w Bjw 2 
where Bj is a matrix of zeroes and ones. Calling S = S1 x S2, we have 
as a consequence of proposition 8. 
As we see, we can give the same parametric treatment, deduced from the 
axioms, to  problems under certainty and under uncertainty. We shall use this 
general parametric model in the following section. An example will be given in 
the last section. 
5 Orders and solution concepts 
The main thrust of the parametric model is to order the alternatives in a Pareto 
sense. 
ak 5 a j  \ Z l k ( ~ )  5 \Zlj(w),Vw E S. 
The solutions of the problem are the nondominated ones. 
Definition 4 a, dominates ak $ak 5 a, and -(aj 5 ak). We write it ak 4 a,. 
Definition 5 a, is nondominated if there is no ak E A such that a j  4 ak. 
It may seem appealing to propose as solutions those a j  that maxirnise \Zlj(w) 
for some w E S. They have received several names in the literature, e.g. quasi- 
Bayesian (Rios, 1975, in a context in which there is uncertainty in the probabilities) 
and potentially optimal (Hazen, 1986, in an uncertain value or utility functions 
context). We adopt the latter term. 
Definition 6 a j  is potentially optimal (p.0.) if \Zlk(w) 5 \Zlj(w),Vak E A, for 
some w E S. 
In principle, there is no reason to introduce p.0. solutions into a decision analysis 
under partial information. The DM needs only consider the nondominated solu- 
tions. However, if we knew w for sure, we should propose those a, maximising 
\Zlj(w); as we know that w E S, our final solution will be among the potentially 
optimal alternatives. 
Some relations between both concepts can be seen in White (1982). Further 
relations, taking into account this parametric representation, can be seen in Rios 
Insua (1990). Those results show that we should look for the nondominated po- 
tentially optimal alternatives, what essentially implies carrying out a family of 
coherent decision analyses and basing conclusions on common grounds, thus em- 
bodying coherence. 
6 A portfolio selection example 
This example is adapted from French (1986). A broker has to decide among six 
investments {al, az, a3, ad, as, a6). Their next year payoffs depend on the future 
financial market which might have very low (el), low (e2), medium (e3) or high 
(84) activity. Each investment pays off after one year. Payoffs are given in the 
table. The broker must choose one and only one of the investments. 
Alternatives are ranked according to their expected utility 
Let us call: 
There are some constraints in the probabilities 
i=l 
(for example, the first one means that the broker believes that a very low to low 
market is at least as likely as a medium to high market). To ensure monotonicity 
in the utilities, we add the constraints 
w8 I w7 
w7 5 W6. 
The bounds of the parameters are: 
6.1 Themodel 
Par 
WI 
w2 
~3 
wq 
w5 
~6 
w7 
ws 
wg 
W ~ O  
W l l  
The uncertainty in this problem is both in the probabilities and the utilities. We 
have 
LB 
.20 
.20 
.10 
.10 
1.0 
.85 
.80 
.75 
.60 
.30 
.oo 
4 
Vj(w) = C wiw,, 
i=l 
UB 
.50 
.40 
.40 
.60 
1.0 
.95 
.90 
.85 
.75 
.60 
.oo 
where wij = u(ai j )  E {ws, . . . , wll). For example, 
which can be written 
with 
and B1 the matrix 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0  
Similarly, we associate bilinear evaluation functions with the rest of the alterna- 
tives. The constraints can be written 
The set of potentially optimal nondominated solutions is 
(a1 a69 a2 a4)- 
See Rios Insua and French (1990) for algorithms to compute these solutions. 
7 Summary 
We have seen a principle allowing us to model imprecision within a Bayesian con- 
text: if the Bayesian foundations require that comparative judgements follow a 
weak order (plus some conditions), comparative judgements regulated by a quasi 
order (plus some similar conditions) lead to modelling judgements by families of 
value functions or by families of probability distributions and utility functions. 
The proper solution concepts are described. In summary, we have a more robust 
decision theory based on a weaker set of axioms, but embodying coherence, since 
it essentially implies carrying out a family of coherent decision analyses and basing 
conclusions on common grounds. The ideas are illustrated with a financial exam- 
ple. Their role in a framework for sensitivity analysis in multiobjective decision 
making can be seen in French and Rios Insua (1989) and Rios Insua and French 
(1 990). 
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